In mechanism design, a strategyproof (SP) mechanism is a game in which each player has a weakly-dominant strategy, so that no player can gain by "spying"...

tie-breaking rule, it might become non-strategyproof. Cardinality-strategyproofness and inclusion-strategyproofness are satisfied by utilitarian approval...

condition "sharing incentive"). Strategyproofness: a user cannot get a larger allocation by lying about his needs. Strategyproofness is important, as evidence...

Again, one can define DD-strategyproofness, BD-strategyproofness, SD-strategyproofness and PC-strategyproofness. Participation - abstaining from participation...

anonymous and strategyproof for all single-peaked preferences iff it is equivalent to a median rule with at most n+1 phantoms. A rule is strategyproof for all...

does not discriminate in advance between different voters. Strong SD-strategyproofness: every false report by an agent results in an outcome that is weakly...

Monotonicity (mechanism design) Preference revelation[disambiguation needed] Strategyproofness Vazirani, Vijay V.; Nisan, Noam; Roughgarden, Tim; Tardos, Éva (2007)...

(where the median rule is strategyproof) and dichotomous or two-party preferences (where approval voting is strategyproof). With large electoral districts...

anonymity, strategyproofness and proportionality among all symmetric single-peaked preferences.: Prop.1  UPM is the only rule satisfying strategyproofness and...

true valuations. They are not strategyproof - a partner can gain by reporting false valuations. Indeed, strategyproofness is incompatible with envy-freeness:...

social choice rule that treats all voters equally while still being strategyproof in all situations. Its application to elections was first described...

network Scalability Sorting network Space syntax Spanning tree protocol Strategyproof Structural cohesion Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Tree and hypertree networks...

routing problems, this mechanism is not only strategyproof, but also the minimum among all strategyproof mechanisms. In the case of network flows, unicast...

{\displaystyle i} and some valuation vector v − i {\displaystyle v_{-i}} . Strategyproofness means that an agent with real valuation v i {\displaystyle v_{i}}...

019. ISSN 0377-2217. Peters, Dominik (2021). "Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections". arXiv:2104.08594 [cs.GT]. Brandl, Florian;...

S a higher utility. Core-FS implies Group-FS. Several variants of strategyproofness (SP) have been studied for voting rules: Individual-SP means that...

efficiency. Maximal lotteries do not satisfy the standard notion of strategyproofness, as shown by Gibbard's theorem. Maximal lotteries are also nonmonotonic...

independence of irrelevant alternatives. Gibbard's theorem shows that any strategyproof game form (i.e. one with a dominant strategy) with more than two outcomes...

characterization of domain restrictions admitting a nondictatorial and strategyproof social welfare function. These correspond to preferences for which there...

best defends her opinions. We then say that approval voting is not strategyproof: once the voter has identified her own preferences, she does not have...

benefit from redistributing its ui among its members (this is a kind of strategyproofness axiom). Additivity - for each agent i, the allocation to i is a linear...

accepted distribution c*. They define a new concept called level-strategyproofness (Level-SP), which is relevant when society's decision is based on...

elicit honest preferences from voters, showing that no voting rule is strategyproof (i.e. does not depend on other voters' preferences) for elections with...

mechanism which is dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (also called strategyproof). A function is Bayesian-Nash implementable if it is attainable by a...

that extends RD (which includes RSD) satisfies both efficiency and strategyproofness. The page on fair random assignment compares RSD to other procedures...

example, envy-freeness (EF) - no agent should envy another agent. Strategyproofness (SP) - each agent has an incentive to report his/her true preferences...

non-monetary mechanisms.) Azis, Haris; Li, Bo; Wu, Xiaowei (2019-05-22). "Strategyproof and Approximately Maxmin Fair Share Allocation of Chores". DeepAI. arXiv:1905...

 222–256. Breton, M.L. and Sen, A., 1999. Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability. Econometrica, 67(3), pp. 605–628. Sen, A., 2001...

alternative of each agent (e.g. plurality voting), RFTT is equivalent to strategyproofness. This means that, for 3 or more outcomes, the only RFTT mechanisms...

Support monotonicity without additional voters Consistency inclusion- strategyproofness Computational complexity Approval voting strong ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ P Proportional...