implementability).[citation needed] The monotonicity property is necessary for strategyproofness.[citation needed] A single-parameter domain is a game in which each...

tie-breaking rule, it might become non-strategyproof. Cardinality-strategyproofness and inclusion-strategyproofness are satisfied by utilitarian approval...

condition "sharing incentive"). Strategyproofness: a user cannot get a larger allocation by lying about his needs. Strategyproofness is important, as evidence...

the standard notion of strategyproofness, as Allan Gibbard has shown that only random dictatorships can satisfy strategyproofness and ex post efficiency...

Again, one can define DD-strategyproofness, BD-strategyproofness, SD-strategyproofness and PC-strategyproofness. Participation - abstaining from participation...

preferences (where the median rule is strategyproof) and dichotomous preferences (where approval or score voting are strategyproof). With large electoral districts...

lottery does not discriminate in advance between different voters. Strategyproofness: any false report by an agent results in an outcome that is weakly...

anonymous and strategyproof for all single-peaked preferences if it is equivalent to a median rule with at most n+1 phantoms. A rule is strategyproof for all...

two outcomes a voter prefers, not how much. This can be replaced by strategyproofness, i.e. every person's dominant strategy is to honestly disclose their...

anonymity, strategyproofness and proportionality among all symmetric single-peaked preferences.: Prop.1  UPM is the only rule satisfying strategyproofness and...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

Lindahl tax Monotonicity (mechanism design) Preference revelation Strategyproofness Vazirani, Vijay V.; Nisan, Noam; Roughgarden, Tim; Tardos, Éva (2007)...

{\displaystyle i} and some valuation vector v − i {\displaystyle v_{-i}} . Strategyproofness means that an agent with real valuation v i {\displaystyle v_{i}}...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

rule satisfying non-imposition (every alternative can be chosen) and strategyproofness when there are more than two candidates is the dictatorship mechanism...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

independence of irrelevant alternatives. Gibbard's theorem shows that any strategyproof game form (i.e. one with a dominant strategy) with more than two outcomes...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

routing problems, this mechanism is not only strategyproof, but also the minimum among all strategyproof mechanisms. In the case of network flows, unicast...

tied vote, assuming some selected voter has expressed a preference. Strategyproofness: there is never any advantage to tactical voting. Failed criteria...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

019. ISSN 0377-2217. Peters, Dominik (2021). "Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections". arXiv:2104.08594 [cs.GT]. Brandl, Florian;...