explanation needed] Incentive compatibility Obvious strategyproofness - a strengthening of strategyproofness Individual rationality Participation criterion...

mechanism design, obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is a strengthening of strategyproofness that captures a robustness of strategyproofness to cognitively-limited...

tie-breaking rule, it might become non-strategyproof. Cardinality-strategyproofness and inclusion-strategyproofness are satisfied by utilitarian approval...

condition "sharing incentive"). Strategyproofness: a user cannot get a larger allocation by lying about his needs. Strategyproofness is important, as evidence...

lottery does not discriminate in advance between different voters. Strategyproofness: any false report by an agent results in an outcome that is weakly...

the standard notion of strategyproofness, as Allan Gibbard has shown that only random dictatorships can satisfy strategyproofness and ex post efficiency...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

preferences (where the median rule is strategyproof) and dichotomous preferences (where approval or score voting are strategyproof). With large electoral districts...

Again, one can define DD-strategyproofness, BD-strategyproofness, SD-strategyproofness and PC-strategyproofness. Participation - abstaining from participation...

anonymous and strategyproof for all single-peaked preferences if it is equivalent to a median rule with at most n+1 phantoms. A rule is strategyproof for all...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

independence of irrelevant alternatives. Gibbard's theorem shows that any strategyproof game form (i.e. one with a dominant strategy) with more than two outcomes...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

two outcomes a voter prefers, not how much. This can be replaced by strategyproofness, i.e. every person's dominant strategy is to honestly disclose their...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

tied vote, assuming some selected voter has expressed a preference. Strategyproofness: there is never any advantage to tactical voting. Failed criteria...

true valuations. They are not strategyproof - a partner can gain by reporting false valuations. Indeed, strategyproofness is incompatible with envy-freeness:...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

{\displaystyle i} and some valuation vector v − i {\displaystyle v_{-i}} . Strategyproofness means that an agent with real valuation v i {\displaystyle v_{i}}...

routing problems, this mechanism is not only strategyproof, but also the minimum among all strategyproof mechanisms. In the case of network flows, unicast...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

rule satisfying non-imposition (every alternative can be chosen) and strategyproofness when there are more than two candidates is the dictatorship mechanism...

anonymity, strategyproofness and proportionality among all symmetric single-peaked preferences.: Prop.1  UPM is the only rule satisfying strategyproofness and...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...