explanation needed] Incentive compatibility Obvious strategyproofness - a strengthening of strategyproofness Individual rationality Participation criterion...

tie-breaking rule, it might become non-strategyproof. Cardinality-strategyproofness and inclusion-strategyproofness are satisfied by utilitarian approval...

mechanism design, obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is a strengthening of strategyproofness that captures a robustness of strategyproofness to cognitively-limited...

condition "sharing incentive"). Strategyproofness: a user cannot get a larger allocation by lying about his needs. Strategyproofness is important, as evidence...

lottery does not discriminate in advance between different voters. Strategyproofness: any false report by an agent results in an outcome that is weakly...

the standard notion of strategyproofness, as Allan Gibbard has shown that only random dictatorships can satisfy strategyproofness and ex post efficiency...

Lindahl tax Monotonicity (mechanism design) Preference revelation Strategyproofness Vazirani, Vijay V.; Nisan, Noam; Roughgarden, Tim; Tardos, Éva (2007)...

Again, one can define DD-strategyproofness, BD-strategyproofness, SD-strategyproofness and PC-strategyproofness. Participation - abstaining from participation...

preferences (where the median rule is strategyproof) and dichotomous preferences (where approval or score voting are strategyproof). With large electoral districts...

{\displaystyle i} and some valuation vector v − i {\displaystyle v_{-i}} . Strategyproofness means that an agent with real valuation v i {\displaystyle v_{i}}...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

anonymous and strategyproof for all single-peaked preferences if it is equivalent to a median rule with at most n+1 phantoms. A rule is strategyproof for all...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

tied vote, assuming some selected voter has expressed a preference. Strategyproofness: there is never any advantage to tactical voting. Failed criteria...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

two outcomes a voter prefers, not how much. This can be replaced by strategyproofness, i.e. every person's dominant strategy is to honestly disclose their...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

independence of irrelevant alternatives. Gibbard's theorem shows that any strategyproof game form (i.e. one with a dominant strategy) with more than two outcomes...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

routing problems, this mechanism is not only strategyproof, but also the minimum among all strategyproof mechanisms. In the case of network flows, unicast...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

characterization of domain restrictions admitting a nondictatorial and strategyproof social welfare function. These correspond to preferences for which there...

network Scalability Sorting network Space syntax Spanning Tree Protocol Strategyproof Structural cohesion Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Tree and hypertree networks...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...

rule satisfying non-imposition (every alternative can be chosen) and strategyproofness when there are more than two candidates is the dictatorship mechanism...

design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem...