In mechanism design, a strategyproof (SP) mechanism is a game in which each player has a weakly-dominant strategy, so that no player can gain by "spying"...
14 KB (2,600 words) - 01:26, 20 May 2024
tie-breaking rule, it might become non-strategyproof. Cardinality-strategyproofness and inclusion-strategyproofness are satisfied by utilitarian approval...
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condition "sharing incentive"). Strategyproofness: a user cannot get a larger allocation by lying about his needs. Strategyproofness is important, as evidence...
7 KB (1,068 words) - 21:30, 14 March 2024
Again, one can define DD-strategyproofness, BD-strategyproofness, SD-strategyproofness and PC-strategyproofness. Participation - abstaining from participation...
12 KB (1,706 words) - 01:45, 9 May 2024
Median voting rule (section Proof of strategyproofness)
anonymous and strategyproof for all single-peaked preferences iff it is equivalent to a median rule with at most n+1 phantoms. A rule is strategyproof for all...
15 KB (2,181 words) - 14:49, 11 June 2024
does not discriminate in advance between different voters. Strong SD-strategyproofness: every false report by an agent results in an outcome that is weakly...
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(where the median rule is strategyproof) and dichotomous or two-party preferences (where approval voting is strategyproof). With large electoral districts...
56 KB (6,546 words) - 21:56, 13 June 2024
Monotonicity (mechanism design) Preference revelation[disambiguation needed] Strategyproofness Vazirani, Vijay V.; Nisan, Noam; Roughgarden, Tim; Tardos, Éva (2007)...
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anonymity, strategyproofness and proportionality among all symmetric single-peaked preferences.: Prop.1 UPM is the only rule satisfying strategyproofness and...
29 KB (3,962 words) - 19:25, 10 June 2024
social choice rule that treats all voters equally while still being strategyproof in all situations. Its application to elections was first described...
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true valuations. They are not strategyproof - a partner can gain by reporting false valuations. Indeed, strategyproofness is incompatible with envy-freeness:...
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019. ISSN 0377-2217. Peters, Dominik (2021). "Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections". arXiv:2104.08594 [cs.GT]. Brandl, Florian;...
29 KB (3,558 words) - 15:26, 22 December 2023
routing problems, this mechanism is not only strategyproof, but also the minimum among all strategyproof mechanisms. In the case of network flows, unicast...
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network Scalability Sorting network Space syntax Spanning tree protocol Strategyproof Structural cohesion Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Tree and hypertree networks...
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efficiency. Maximal lotteries do not satisfy the standard notion of strategyproofness, as shown by Gibbard's theorem. Maximal lotteries are also nonmonotonic...
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{\displaystyle i} and some valuation vector v − i {\displaystyle v_{-i}} . Strategyproofness means that an agent with real valuation v i {\displaystyle v_{i}}...
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S a higher utility. Core-FS implies Group-FS. Several variants of strategyproofness (SP) have been studied for voting rules: Individual-SP means that...
25 KB (3,333 words) - 23:26, 17 February 2024
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Gibbard's theorem shows that any strategyproof game form (i.e. one with a dominant strategy) with more than two outcomes...
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characterization of domain restrictions admitting a nondictatorial and strategyproof social welfare function. These correspond to preferences for which there...
64 KB (5,758 words) - 18:01, 11 June 2024
best defends her opinions. We then say that approval voting is not strategyproof: once the voter has identified her own preferences, she does not have...
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benefit from redistributing its ui among its members (this is a kind of strategyproofness axiom). Additivity - for each agent i, the allocation to i is a linear...
4 KB (521 words) - 13:12, 21 September 2023
accepted distribution c*. They define a new concept called level-strategyproofness (Level-SP), which is relevant when society's decision is based on...
21 KB (2,521 words) - 16:14, 19 February 2024
elicit honest preferences from voters, showing that no voting rule is strategyproof (i.e. does not depend on other voters' preferences) for elections with...
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that extends RD (which includes RSD) satisfies both efficiency and strategyproofness. The page on fair random assignment compares RSD to other procedures...
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example, envy-freeness (EF) - no agent should envy another agent. Strategyproofness (SP) - each agent has an incentive to report his/her true preferences...
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mechanism which is dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (also called strategyproof). A function is Bayesian-Nash implementable if it is attainable by a...
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alternative of each agent (e.g. plurality voting), RFTT is equivalent to strategyproofness. This means that, for 3 or more outcomes, the only RFTT mechanisms...
10 KB (1,443 words) - 10:35, 28 May 2024
non-monetary mechanisms.) Azis, Haris; Li, Bo; Wu, Xiaowei (2019-05-22). "Strategyproof and Approximately Maxmin Fair Share Allocation of Chores". DeepAI. arXiv:1905...
32 KB (4,115 words) - 18:58, 6 June 2024
222–256. Breton, M.L. and Sen, A., 1999. Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability. Econometrica, 67(3), pp. 605–628. Sen, A., 2001...
30 KB (3,524 words) - 19:32, 4 June 2024
Support monotonicity without additional voters Consistency inclusion- strategyproofness Computational complexity Approval voting strong ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ P Proportional...
11 KB (1,136 words) - 10:56, 5 January 2024