Sensualismo – Wikipédia, a enciclopédia livre

Em epistemologia, o sensualismo é uma doutrina pela qual as sensações e a percepção são a forma básica e mais importante da verdadeira cognição. Pode opor-se a ideias abstratas.^[1]

Essa questão ideogenética foi há muito tempo apresentada na filosofia grega (estoicismo, epicurismo) e desenvolvida ao máximo pelos sensualistas britânicos (John Locke, David Hume) e pelos associacionistas britânicos (Thomas Brown, David Hartley, Joseph Priestley). No século XIX foi muito retomado pelos positivistas (Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Hippolyte Taine, Émile Littré).^[2]^[3]

Referências[editar | editar código-fonte]

↑ José Ortega y Gasset; Julián Marías (2000). Meditations on Quixote. trans. Evelyn Rugg and Diego Marín. [S.l.]: University of Illinois Press. p. 85. ISBN 0-252-06895-5
↑ According to Schopenhauer, this judgment was attributed to Aristotle. Schopenhauer presents the Latin version as Nihil est in intellectu nisi quod antea fuerit in sensu. See The World as Will and Representation, Volume II, Chapter VII. It is possible that it was mentioned by the Stoic Cicero and was repeated by Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas.
↑ «Philosophy - Encyclopedia Volume - Catholic Encyclopedia»

[1] José Ortega y Gasset; Julián Marías (2000). Meditations on Quixote. trans. Evelyn Rugg and Diego Marín. [S.l.]: University of Illinois Press. p. 85. ISBN 0-252-06895-5

[2] According to Schopenhauer, this judgment was attributed to Aristotle. Schopenhauer presents the Latin version as Nihil est in intellectu nisi quod antea fuerit in sensu. See The World as Will and Representation, Volume II, Chapter VII. It is possible that it was mentioned by the Stoic Cicero and was repeated by Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas.

[3] «Philosophy - Encyclopedia Volume - Catholic Encyclopedia»

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